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Recently, after a new landslide electoral victory by Viktor Orban, who again managed to
win a constitutional majority in the Hungarian parliament, a fresh perspective on
constitutional developments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has started taking shape.
It could be described as constitutional appeasement.
Accordingly, the argument goes that given a widespread popular support for the
constitutionally backsliding regimes in Hungary, Poland as well as elsewhere, we should –
as good and open-minded people (and especially as social scientists) – start examining our
own theoretical premises from which we have been observing and evaluating the
developments in CEE. Perhaps, there is not everything wrong with CEE political and
institutional developments? Perhaps, there are some good reasons for those trends? It
could be, in some way which is from our constitutional perspective still not quite visible, that
those trends are pointing in a better, even right direction and carry the promise of reforming
our, admittedly, rather dated and worn-out constitutional conceptions and self-
understanding. Why not learning something from the CEE constitutional developments? Let
us engage into a dialogue, elevate ourselves beyond and above our constitutional
epistemic and normative confines, accept ‘the other’ and build something new, a reformed
European constitutionalism, by working closely together with the profoundly democratically
legitimated constitutional and political actors in CEE.  In short, the case for a special,
distinct conception of Central and Eastern European Constitutionalism indeed could be
persuasively made. Is that right?
The Case for CEE Constitutionalism
Let us first study what the content of the alleged CEE constitutionalism might consist of. In
normative terms, the emphasis appears to be on collective values. A nation, conceived in
ethnic terms, deserves a special constitutional protection. In contrast to liberal democracy,
where an individual, irrespective of his or her many natural and social traits, is at the heart
of the constitutional order, in illiberal democracy – recently rebranded as ‘Christian
democracy’  by Orbán and others – individuals are principally parts of a collective whole, of
a nation; and the individuals who ethnically belong to the nation can enjoy more rights as
the individuals who do not. This constitutional approach privileges the idea of a common
good, understood as the good of the many, over individual ambitions to pursue their own
individual conceptions of the good. This paves the way to a more authoritative, more
comprehensive and omnipresent use of political power that should be subject to fewer
constraints as long as it is exercised efficiently and it (declaratorily) maximizes the common
good of the many.
In institutional terms, this translates directly into a lesser need for a sophisticated system of
checks and balances. The latter might simply present too many obstacles for an efficient
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exercise of power.  As the experience shows that especially the judiciary can pose many
problems to the smooth implementation of the democratically legitimated legislative and the
executive agenda, it is, apparently, appropriate to appoint more deferent and loyal judges,
ideologically and politically close to a democratically elected government. For it is loyalty,
and this does not go just for the judiciary, but it indeed applies across the range of (semi)-
independent (quasi-)executive, (quasi-)judicial institutions, that is decisive for a good
functioning of a democratically elected government. The fewer obstacles the government is
subject to, the better for the wellbeing of the state and its people. Consent is privileged over
dissent. Uniformity and loyalty is a guarantee for the former, diversity, freedom and
autonomy lead to the latter. Hence, uniformity and loyalty ought to be strengthened by as
deep as possible penetration of the political power in the civil society, by formally and
informally, financially and morally awarding the loyal, and, in the same manner, deterring
the non-loyal. This, for example, explains, indeed justifies, a special treatment of foreign
funded and hence non-loyal NGOs in Hungary, and preferential approach to those civil
society groups which are closer to the ruling political party in Poland.
Law and lawyers also play a very different role under CEE constitutionalism. By contrast to
Western constitutionalism, where law has won some institutional autonomy from politics
and power in general and follows, as well as imposes, certain constraints on power for its
fair exercise, the conception of law in CEE countries dates back to the late 19th and early
20th century Europe. CEE countries are Rechtsstaaten in the primitive sense. They are,
literally, states with the law, where law is conceived of and, in particular, applied as a mere
instrument of (political) power. According to this ancillary conception of law, law can be
used and abused for a whatsoever purpose and objective in the public, eg governmental
interest. The interests of this rule by the law are achieved simply by conferring a legal form
on an essentially arbitrary exercise of political power.   Lawyers too are complicit in this
process and have been ready and willing to bend and sacrifice their professional integrity,
in the name of loyalty and in exchange for (in)formal rewards, to make this utterly
politicized use of the law possible.
Finally, under CEE constitutionalism the governments are allowed, perhaps even obliged,
to put their political authority in the service of a particular moral conception of a political
community over which they rule. This has, for example, amounted to the protection of
traditional values, family life and marriage, privileging a dominant religion in the society, to
include the protection of national homogeneity, historical roots of the national identity and
finally the very defence of the ‘Christian Europe’. These are the real CEE values, which are
simply different from the western, often decadent values that should no longer be imposed
on the eastern part of Europe. This is why, eventually, those who have branded this
approach to constitutionalism as moralizing, anti-pluralist and hence populist, have simply
missed the point. In fact, moralization, anti-pluralism and defence of our people is the
essence of CEE constitutionalism in the EU. These are the constitutive elements of the
CEE constitutional identity. This identity works for the people and is supported by the
people. It is anti-pluralist because it is interested in solutions and outcomes, in maximizing
the common good of the people rather than being concerned with checks and balances.
Finally, it is moralizing because in this de-moralized, ultimately uncertain times of
globalization, under pressure of islamization and further diversification in the population, the
people ask for moral guidance and the government simply needs to deliver.
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A Critique
What, if anything, is wrong with this argument to recognize, even theoretically, a self-
standing autonomous conception of CEE constitutionalism and make room for it inside the
public law of the European Union?
The first problem is of a conceptual character. It begs a question, not unlike the one posed
by Alice in the Wonderland, whether words can mean just whatever one wants them to
mean. Is constitutionalism conceptually elastic enough to cover and embrace even the
developments in CEE, to call it CEE constitutionalism? Or, are there, alternatively, certain
conditions that any political practice has to meet to be described as constitutional?
Constitutionalism is a social and hence an interpretative concept. It has no essential
meaning of its own. However, it does have a conventional meaning, which has evolved out
of centuries of interpretative processes reflecting the discursive and political fights in the
real world out there. This historical social construction of constitutionalism has put at its
heart the individual. Accordingly, each and every individual is recognized an equal human
dignity standing for the right of self-fulfilment or self-determination. The right to equal
human dignity, in turn, dictates two further primordial individual rights: freedom and equality
within the ambit of equal rights of others. These two rights entail that each individual should
be free of arbitrary treatment. Any incursion in the freedom and equality of an individual, be
it in vertical or horizontal relations, therefore requires a justification. This, namely non-
arbitrariness, is, as Martin Krygier has taught us, what the rule of law stands for and what
the rule of law is, simultaneously, there to guarantee.
On the other hand, democracy is understood as a vehicle of self-determination and as a
means of ensuring freedom of each and every individual. Democracy is a political system
in which its subjects are the authors of their own laws. It is a system of self-legislation that,
out of recognition of equality, requires an equal opportunity for each individual to take part
in a democratic process as inclusive as possible. This equal right to participate in the
democratic process cannot be achieved without the rule of law, in an arbitrary environment;
and, simultaneously, there can be no meaningful rule of law if the rules are not created in a
democratic manner.  This means that a modern conventional understanding of
constitutionalism necessarily and intrinsically conjoins the rule of law and democracy in a
holistic notion of constitutionalism.  They condition and require all the essential
constitutional rights and freedoms, such as freedom of conscience, freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly, freedom of education and judicial protection; as well as institutional
safeguards in form of checks and balances to ultimately ensure to each and every
individual a fair and justified enjoyment of his or her equal freedom.
A political practice, such as that of some CEE countries, which departs from the described
conventional meaning of modern constitutionalism in all of its constitutive elements, cannot
be persuasively labelled as constitutional. Putting the individual in service of the collective
violates the starting point of constitutionalism. Privileging the already dominant religion;
closing down channels of communication; clamping down on NGOs and sanctioning non-
compliant universities;  undermining judicial independence and impartiality; totalizing power
by gradually removing checks and balances etc. – none of that can be convincingly
described as constitutionalism without doing violence to the conventional meaning of the
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term or without committing a error of category. The political practices of the rogue CEE
countries do not stand for a special version of constitutionalism. They are not its special
eastern brand. By contrast, the practices in CEE are the constitutionalism’s antipode; its
denial. They amount to nothing more and nothing less than authoritarianism dressing up in
the constitutional language.
If already the conceptual critique of CEE constitutionalism is found successful, then the
story can basically end here. The very conceptual basis for describing the authoritarian
practices as constitutional is lacking. However, even if the opposite was true and the
practice of CEE states could be identified as a special type of regional constitutionalism, the
advocates of this account would face a significant political problem. By joining the European
Union, they have joined a club whose values are clearly identified and openly incompatible
with those proposed by CEE constitutionalism. To claim 10 years later that CEE countries
actually have their own values, on which a distinct model of constitutionalism is being
constructed, is simply unpersuasive. This argument would not work in any golf club of an
average quality, let alone in the European Union, which has been developed as a
community of law. The only response such an argumentative move would deserve is: either
share our values or leave.
Furthermore, it should be recognized in this context that the argument about the existence
of unique CEE values sensu lato does not rest on any convincing historical grounds. To the
contrary, CEE has been since the end of the WWII on a permanent road back to Europe.
What was then understood as Western Europe was in fact a shared cultural space from
which the CEE countries had been forcefully removed by the three totalitarian regimes of
the 20th century. The re-assertion of CEE countries, their emancipation as it were, was
motivated precisely, even exclusively, by the values that present the backbone of modern
constitutionalism. These values were even much more appreciated in the East than in the
West, simply because in the East they were much more and much longer violated and
trampled upon. To argue, following 2010, that the time has come to put the Western liberal
imperialism to an end, amounts to committing a historical error, for bashing something that
has actually never existed. To fight liberal imperialism of the West means defying the very
values in the name of which and for whose realization the CEE countries have emerged out
of the ashes of communism.
In short, history belies the existence of CEE autonomous political, constitutional values,
which would be qualitatively at odds with the constitutional values of Western Europe.
While of course, these values can be also interpreted and applied differently in different
contexts, behind the fundamental boundaries of different polities that EU member states
stand for, deep down these different polities all share the basic pre-political foundations of
what it takes to create a community of equals, in which the conditions are laid for an
inclusive, pluralist, and above all, fair political play between the divergent worldviews and
the many competing conceptions of the good.
Next, it is argued, that those who are making the claims in favour of CEE constitutionalism
fail to make a normatively convincing case for it. Their pursuit of illiberal democracy as a
flagship project of CEE constitutionalism is full of performative contradictions. We are, for
example, witnessing politicians defending ‘Christian Europe’ in the utmost non-Christian
way. The most vocal proponents of traditional values, family and marriage, show little sign
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of affording these values a meaningful place in their actual lives. Furthermore, normatively
the case has not been made why, say, Christianity, family and marriage, as well as a
particular conception of national constitutional identity, could not be defended and even
promoted in the ‘Western’ model of constitutionalism. Has it not been precisely
constitutionalism, and only constitutionalism, that has made these value-commitments
viable and continues to make them possible in practice? Of course, not as part of a political,
public power fiat, but as a matter of personal, individual choice within the ambit of respect
for equal rights of others. There is nothing in ‘Western constitutionalism’ that prevents the
individuals and communities from staying faithful to the traditional values. Indeed, that is
one of their constitutional rights, which, however, cannot and should not be imposed on
those other individuals and communities who would like to use the very same rights to
make different value choices.
Finally, how to respond to the purportedly democratic argument, according to which CEE
constitutionalism indeed does exist and should be recognized as such for it has repeatedly
won popular legitimation in more than one state? Like in the case of constitutionalism,
democracy comes with certain conventional content and meaning too. Admittedly,
democracy has been one of the most abused social concepts. Not infrequently, the most
undemocratic countries boast with democracy in their names. However, it is clear that shall
democracy retain any positive and coherent normative meaning, its conception of the
people in whose name and for whom all the powers are exercised must proceed from the
assumption that the people are composed of and constitute a community of equals, who
deserve and are entitled to equal respect. Building a democracy where a strict dividing line
is drawn between us and them; between our people and the others; and whereby in name
of our people the power is totalized and those who are different are excluded from it,
obviously runs affront the idea(l) of community of equals. Hence, such a democracy is not a
democracy in the conventional sense, but a more or less haphazard, arbitrary political
system in which the argument of power reigns over the power of arguments.
In CEE countries, where the nominal system of democracy has been so much institutionally
and substantively, formally and informally, tampered by a single (formal or informal) ruling
political power in favour of its political, economic and civil society clique, a real democracy
no longer exists, and what is described as free and fair election is, in reality, just a
semblance of it. In short, the more successful and far-reaching constitutional capture of the
state, the greater the likelihood for its overwhelming ‘democratic’ support. The examples of
the German Democratic Republic, the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea attest to that point and there are few, if any, who would be
willing to describe these countries as democratic in the best conventional meaning of the
term.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, no plausible, let alone theoretically convincing case can be made in
favour of existence of a special CEE constitutionalism inside the EU legal common whole. 
There are strong conceptual, political, normative, historical and democratic reasons which
prove that branding the existing CEE political practices as constitutional in their own,
distinct way, separate from ‘Western constitutionalism’, is deeply flawed. The events in
5/6
CEE post-2010 are not an example of new constitutionalism, but stand for a revival of
authoritarianism, which is incompatible not only with the fundamental values of the
European Union, but even with the minimal common value denominator of the more
encompassing Council of Europe. There should be no room for such political developments
inside the EU and, especially, constitutional theory should not be making room for it.
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